Monte-Carlo methods make Dempster-Shafer formalism feasible by Kreinovich, Vladik YA. et al.
7NASA-CR-|92965
MONTE-CARLO METHODS MAKE DEMPSTER-SHAFER FORMALISM
FEASIBLE
Vladik Kreinovich, Andrew Bernat, Walter Borrett,
Yvonne Mariscal, Elsa Villa
Computer Science Department
The University of Texas at E1 Paso
E1 Paso, TX 79968, USA
#?- ?'3 2-
?.j?
0
I "-- 0',
_u_
: LId o') <
IOW
tt_LD
: _t I:D tt_
- N LD t_
; O" _ tI.
: I _IE
_ I _..I
2 'el C::I <I
:ZuuO
Abstract: One of the main obstacles to the applications of Dempster-Shafer formalism is its
computational complexity. If we combine rn different pieces of knowledge, then in general
case we have to perform up to 2 m computational steps, which for large m is infeasible.
For several important cases algorithms with smaller running time have been proposed. We
prove, however, that if we want to compute the belief bd(Q) in any given query Q, then
exponential time is inevitable.
It is still inevitable, if we want to compute bel(Q) with given precision e. This restric-
tion corresponds to the natural idea that since initial masses are known only approximately,
there is no sense in trying to compute beI(Q) precisely. A further idea is that there is al-
ways some doubt in the whole knowledge, so there is always a probability P0 that the
expert's knowledge is wrong. In view of that it is sufficient to have an algorithm that gives
a correct answer a probability > 1 -P0. If we use the original Dempster's combination
rule, this possibility diminishes the running time, but still leaves the problem infeasible in
the general case.
We show that for the alternative combination rules proposed by Smets and Yager
feasible methods exist. We also show how these methods can be parallelized, and what
parallelization model fits this problem best.
I(eywords: Dempster-Shafer formalism, combination rules, Monte-Carlo methods, feasi-
ble, parallel.
1. FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM
Dempster-Shafer formalism in brief. Dempster-Shafer (DS) formalism, proposed in
(Sharer, 1976), is very promising and is already widely used. In this formalism knowledge
is described by a finite set of statements E_,...,E_, to each of which a number (mass)
m(Ei) is assigned so that }--_i rn(Ei) = 1. Then, if someone asks a query Q, we must
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produce as an answer the beIief bel(Q) that Q is true. This belief is defined as a sum of
masses rn(Ei) of all the statements E/ that imply Q (i.e., for which Ei _ Q is true). In
addition to belief in Q one can also ask for the pIausibility pl(Q) of Q.
Comment. From the computational viewpoint the problems of computing bel and pI are
equivalent, because beI(Q) = 1- pl(_Q) and pl(Q) = 1-bel(-_Q). Therefore in the
following text we'll analyze only the problem of computing beliefs. In (Yager, 1987) a
slightly different definition of plausibility is given; our negative theorems and algorithms
can be easily applied to this definition as well.
If we have several pieces of knowledge that are represented in the Dempster-Shafer
form, then we can combine them into a single knowledge base. Several combination rules
have been proposed. The original Dempster's rule is as follows: if we are given two pieces
(El, m I (Ei)) and (Fi, rn2(Fi)), then for the statements of the resulting knowledge base we
take all consistent combinations Ei&Fj, and to each of these statements X we assign the
mass
re(X) = El,i: X--.(Z,,_F_) m,(Ei)m2(Fj)
where Consis means consistent and _i,j: A means the sum over all i,j, for which .4 is
true.
Comment. Informally speaking, this means that we neglect all the inconsistent combina-
tions and "divide" our belief between the consistent ones.
It was shown (Zadeh, 1984) that this rule sometimes contradicts our intuition. Fol-
lowing (Smets, 1988), let us briefly describe this contradiction. Suppose that we have
three suspects in a murder case: Peter, Paul, and Mary, and two witnesses. The first
witness is almost sure that Peter is a murderer, and his degrees of belief are: 0.99 that
Peter murdered, 0.01 that Paul murdered, and 0 that Mary did it. The second witness
has a 0.99 belief that Mary is the murderer, 0.01 that Paul is the murderer, and 0 that
Peter is the one. From commonsense viewpoint, this means that we have strong suspi-
cions against Peter and Mary. However, the original Dempster's rule leads to a different
conclusion. Indeed, let us denote "Peter is the murderer" by El, "Paul is the murderer"
by E2, and "Mary is the murderer" by E3. Then, the beliefs rnl, rn2 of the two witnesses
are ml(E1) = m2(E3) -- 0.99, rnl(E3) = m2(E1) = 0, and rnl(E2) : m2(E.2) = 0.0i. The
original Dempster's combination rule than leads to m(E_) = 1 and re(E1) = re(E3) = 0,
i.e., to the conclusion that Paul is certainly the murderer.
Becauseof this contradiction, alternative combination rules were proposed by Yager
(1985, 1987) and Smets (1988). Smets proposed the formula
re(X) : E rn1(E{)m2(Fi)
i,j: X*-(Ei&Fi)
for all X (in particular for identically false X = f, that corresponds to the case, when
the statements Ei and Fj are inconsistent). For the case when we have to combine k > 2
pieces of knowledge, he proposed a likewise formula
= ml(E,)...mk(r;).
i .... ,j: X_--.(Ei&...&Fj.)
Yager applies this rule only for X, that are different from t ("identically true") and f
("identically false"), and assigns re(f) = 0 and
re(t) =
i ..... j: ".Consis(Ei&...a_ Fj ) Vt*--.(Ei &...& Fj )
Computational complexity is the main obstacle to the application of Dempster-
Shafer formalism. Although this formalism is widely used, but there are some obstacles
to its application, the main of which is its computational complexity (Bonissone, 1987,
Dempster and Kong, 1987, Kyburg, 1987, Paass 1988, Pearl 1988, Hsia 1989, Phillips
1990). Indeed, when we apply one of the above combination rules to combine m pieces
of knowledge, and each of them consist of at least 2 different statements, then we have
to analyze at least 2 rn different combinations of statements. Therefore we must make at
least 2 m computational steps. For large rn this is infeasible (e.g., for m = 200 it takes
> 1060 steps). So it is difficult to compute masses. But even if we manage to compute
them, there is still a problem to compute beliefs from masses. If we directly apply the
above formula for bel(Q), and the number of statements in the resulting knowledge base
is exponentially large, we must undertake exponentially many computational steps. The
running time remains exponentially big even if we use the computationally optimal "fast
Mobius" algorithm (Kennes, 1990, Kennes and Smets, 1990). So what to do?
For some cases faster algorithms are known that compute bel(Q) for different Q
in < 2 m steps (Barnett, 1981), (Gordon and Shortliffe, 1985), (Sharer, 1985), (Shenoy
and Sharer, 1986), (Shafer and Logan, 1987), (Wilson, 1989, 1991). These methods are
applicable in many important cases, but still the problem remains: what to do in the
general case ?
General case: negative result. Orponen (I990) proved that exponential time is in-
evitable in the following sense: even for the propositional case the problem of computing
beliefs is #P-complete (Garey and Johnson 1979). The majority of computer scientists
believe that P 7_ NP; so from their viewpoint no feasible algorithm is possible for comput-
ing beliefs (likewise results are proved in (lVIaung and Paris, 1990) for different uncertainty
formalisms).
Is this negative result really tragic? To answer this question let's look at the usual
logic, without any masses or degrees of belief. In this case knowledge consists of statements
El, ..., E_,, and for every query Q the possible answers are "yes" (if EI&E2&...&E,., _ Q),
"no" if EI&E2&...&En _ "Q and "unknown" in all other cases. For this case many
negative results are known, starting from the famous Godel's theorem. However, efficient
inference engines and theorem provers exist and are successfully applied. In other words,
theoretically the logical case is infeasible, but in practice it is feasible.
So the natural question is: is the Dempster-Shafer case practically feasible (in some
reasonable sense) or not?
Feasible: in what sense? The natural formulation of this question is as follows: suppose
that we already have an inference engine for logical statements, and we can use it as an
additional tool while computing beliefs bel(Q). In this case the running time is equal to
the weighted sum of the number of real computational steps and the number of calls of
this inference engine. Will this new computational time still be exponentially large?
If it is small, then we can quickly compute beliefs, and therefore DS approach is
feasible. If this running time turns out to be exponentially large, this wouid mean that
even the usage of the existing inference engines does not help, and therefore DS approach
is infeasible.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze whether DS approach is practically feasible (in
the above sense) or not. Our answer will be: "yes, it's feasible".
What we are planning to do. In Section 2 we give precise definitions and formulate
a negative result: that the problem of computing beliefs precisely is practically infeasible.
Since the initial masses express our degree of belief and are therefore only approximately
known, there is no sense in trying to compute the beliefs precisely. However, as we show in
Section 3, the problem of computing the beliefs with a given precision is also infeasible. In
Section 4 we take into consideration that human experts can not only be slightly uncertain
about their degreesof belief, but canalsohave doubts in their wholeknowledge. Therefore,
since there is a probability that what an expert says is absolutely wrong, it is reasonable
to allow the algorithms for computing beI(Q) to err with some (very small) probability.
For Dempster's rule the resulting problem is still infeasible, but for two other rules it is
already feasible[ In Section 5 we show that the methods from Section 4 can be parallelized,
and what parallelization model fits this problem best. All the proofs are given in Section
6.
Our main results first appeared in (Borrett and Kreinovich 1990a, 1990b).
2. ALGORITHMS THAT COMPUTE BELIEFS PRECISELY ARE PRAC-
TICALLY INFEASIBLE
Inference engine: general definition. Assume that some alphabet is given, that in-
cludes the symbols & and f; assume also that two sets of words form this alphabet are
given. The words form the first set will be called statements, words from the second set
queries. We assume that the word f (meaning raise) belongs to both sets, and that if $1
and $2 are statements, then SI&S2 is also a statement. Assume also that an algorithm I
is given, that transforms every pair (S, Q), where S is a statement and Q is a query, into
one of the words "yes" or "no". When I(S, Q)= "yes", we say that Q folIows from S, or S
impges Q and denote it by S ---+Q. We say that the statements S1 and S2 are equivaIent
and denote it by $1 _ $2 if $1 --+ $2 and $2 --+ S1. We demand that this algorithm is
consistent in the sense that if A _ B, then I(A, Q) = _r(B, Q) for all Q. Such consistent
algorithms will be called inference engines.
Comment. One should bear in mind that in many cases (e.g., in first order logic) no
algorithm is possible for which I(S, Q)= "yes" if and only if Q is a logical consequence of
S. Therefore the notion "imply" that stems from the inference engine can be different
from the logical implication.
We say that El,..., Ek impIy Q if EI&E2&...&Ek implies Q. If S implies f, we say
that S is inconsistent, else that S is consistent. The fact that a formula S is consistent
will be denoted by Consis(S).
Dempster-Shafer knowledge base: definition. By a piece of knoMedge we mean a
pair consisting of the finite set of statements El,..., E, and a function m that assigns to
each statement from this set a value m(Ei) >_ 0 so that _ m(Ei) = 1. For every query Q
we define the belief bel(Q) in Q as the sum of m(Ei) for all Ei, for which I(Ei, Q)-- "yes"
(i.e., for which Ei implies Q).
By a Dempster-Shafer knowledge base (or simply knowledge base for short) we mean
a finite list of pieces of knowledge. For every knowledge base we can define the resulting
piece of knowledge by applying one of the above-defined combination rules: Dempster's,
Smets' and Yager's (we'll denote them by D, S and Y). For every query Q by a beliefbeI(Q)
in Q with respect to a knowledge base we mean its belief with respect to the resulting piece
of knowledge.
Comment. In the combination formulas we must understand -% _ and Consis in the
sense of the inference engine I.
In the present section we'll consider algorithms that combine normal computational
steps with calls of an inference engine I.
Comment. In more theoretical terms, we can say that we consider algorithms, that use I
as an oracle (Garey and Johnson, 1979).
Assume that two positive real numbers are fixed: to and re. to will be called the time
of one computational step and tc the time of one caB. For every input by a running time of
an algorithm we mean the total number No of normal computational steps, multiplied by
to, plus the total number Nc of calls, multiplied by tc. By the length of the input we mean
the total length of the knowledge base and the query. By a computational complexity
tu(n) of an algorithm U we mean the maximum of its running time on all the inputs of
length <__n.
We say that an algorithm computes the beliefs precisely if for every inference engine
I, for every knowledge base and every query Q it computes beI(Q).
THEOREM 1 (D, S, Y). If an algorithm U computes the beliefs precisely, then t_:(n) >_
ca n for some a > 1.
Comment. So, whatever combination rule we use, it takes exponentially many compu-
tational steps to compute beliefs precisely. Therefore the problem "to compute beliefs
precisely" is infeasible.
3. ALGORITHMS THAT COMPUTE BELIEFS WITH GIVEN PRECISION
ARE PRACTICALLY INFEASIBLE
Initial masses express our degree of belief. It is very difficult to express one's degree
of belief with great precision: e.g., who can boast that he is 83% and not 84% sure in
something? So these initial degrees of belief are only approximately known, and therefore
there is no sensein trying to compute the resulting beliefs with bigger precision than the
precision of the input data. So the natural idea is to fix someprecision e > 0 and compute
beliefs only with this precision. Alas, the resulting problem is also infeasible. Let us give
precise definitions.
Definition. Assume that a positive number e is fixed. We say that an algorithm U
computes the beliefs with precision e if for every inference engine I, for every knowledge
base and every query Q it generates a real number U(Q), for which IU(Q) - bel(Q)l <_ e.
Comment. If e >_ 1/2, then we can take an algorithm that always generates 1/2, and thus
satisfy this inequality for all possible values of belief. Therefore this definition makes sense
only when e < 1/2.
THEOREM 2 (D, S, Y). If an algorithm U computes the beliefs with precision e < 1/2,
then tu(n) >. ca'* for some a > 1.
So this computation also demands exponential time and is therefore infeasible.
4. MONTE-CARLO METHODS: FEASIBLE FOR SMETS'S AND YAGER'S
RULES, STILL INFEASIBLE FOR DEMPSTER'S RULE
Why probabilistic methods? Let us now take into consideration the fact that human
experts can not only be slightly uncertain about their degrees of belief, but can also have
doubts in their whole knowledge. In other words, there is a probability p0 (small but
positive) that what an expert says is absolutely wrong. If this is the case, then, no matter
what algorithm we apply, the resulting values of belief will be absolutely inadequate. In
view of that it is not necessary to achieve a 100% correctness of the algorithm. The only
thing that is reasonable to demand is that the probability that an algorithm errs must be
smaller than this P0, so that the resulting probability of an error (due both to the possible
errors of the algorithm and the errors in the initial data) is not much greater than p0.
So we arrive at the following definitions:
Definitions. By a standard random number generator we mean a program or device
that generates real numbers that are uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1]. By a
probabiIistic algorithm we mean an algorithm that in addition to normal computational
steps and calling I calls a standard random number generator. The result of applying an
algorithm U to the data :c will be denoted by U(z).
In addition to t0 and tc let us fix a number tr > 0 (called the time of one ca11 of
this random number generator); let us define a running time of a probabilistic algorithm
U on any input data as Noto
computational steps, Nc is the
calls of a generator. Let us now
U as a maximum running time
random number generator. If
polynomiM-time aIgorithm. If
algorithm.
+Nctc + Nrt,-, where No is the totM number of normal
total number of calls of I, and N,- is the total number of
define the computational compIexity tu(n) of an algorithm
for all inputs of length n and for all possible values of the
tu(n) is bounded by some polynomial of n, we call U a
it is limited by a linear function, we call U a Bnear-time
Comment. By definition a probabilistic algorithm uses a random number generator, there-
fore its output is not uniquely determined by the inputs: for every input it is a random
variable.
Definition. Assume that positive numbers e and p0 are given. We say that a state-
ment is reliably true if it is true with probability 1 - P0 or greater. We say that a proba-
bilistic algorithm U computes the beliefs with precision e and reliability 1 - Po if for every
knowledge base, for every inference engine I, and for every query Q it is reliably true that
Iv(Q) - b t(O)l <
In other words, P([U(Q) - bel(Q)l < e) > 1 - po.
Comment. In order to formulate the related negative result we must recall the denotation
RP: it is the class of problem that can be solved (with reliability 1 - p0) in polynomial
time. The majority of computer scientists believe that RP ¢ NP (for details see, e.g.,
Maung and Paris, 1990).
THEOREM 3 (D). //" e < 1/4, Po < 1, and RP _: NP, then there is no polynomial-time
algorithm that computes beliefs with precision e and reliability 1 - Po.
Comment. So if we use Dempster's combination rule, the problem of computing beliefs is
stilI infeasible.
THEOREM 4 (S, Y) For every e < 1/4 and p0 < 1 there exists a linear-time algorithm
that computes beliefs with precision e and reliability 1 - po.
Comments. 1. So the problem is feasible!
2. Linear-time means that when the size of the probiem increases (i.e., the number of
pieces of knowledge increases, and/or the number of statements in every piece), then the
number of calls of the inference engine I grows linearly of slower. What is this time equal
to in absolute units, that is, is it reasonably small or really big, dependson how quickly
the inferenceengine works.
Description of the algorithm. Let us describe the algorithm from Theorem 4.
For that weneedan auxiliary algorithm that givena pieceof knowledge(El, ..., E,_), m,
generates a statement Ei with probability m(Ei). To get it we first compute the values
rl = ra(E1), r2 = m(E1)+m(E2), r3 = r2+m(E3), ..., rn = rn-I +m(En) = re(E1)+...+
rn(E_) = 1. Then we call a standard random number generator and compare the result r
consequently with rl,r2, ...,rn = 1. If r _< ra, generate Ea; if ri-1 < r < ri, generate Ei.
Comments. I. One can easily check that the probability of generating Ei is precisely
m(Ei).
2. This auxiliary algorithm is already a linear-time one. We can, however, further
diminish its running time, if we use bisection search instead of a linear search.
As a second auxiliary step we must find an integer N depending on e and P0; in general
case we can take N = 2e -2 ln(2/p0). For small e and p0 we can take smaller values of N:
e.g., to get a 10% precision and 96% reliability it is sufficient to take N = 100.
Now the main algorithm is as follows. Suppose that we are given a knowledge base,
that consists of several pieces of knowledge P1, ..., Pk. We do the following:
1) (in case of Smets's combination rule) Reserve an integer variable M for a counter,
and set its initial value to 0. Then N time repeat the following:
Apply the auxiliary algorithm to each piece of knowledge Pi, and get a random state-
ment E_'; then apply I to check whether Q follows from all these statements, i.e., whether
I(Ef&E_&...&E_,, Q) = "yes". If "yes", add 1 to the counter M; if not, leave _l/unchanged.
As a desired estimate for bel(Q) we take M/N, where M is the value of the counter
after N iterations.
2) (in case of Yager's combination rule) Same algorithm; the only difference is that
we add 1 if [(Ef&E_&...&E_, Q)="yes" and the set {Ef, E_,...,E_} is consistent, i.e.,
I(E[" & E_ &... & Ek, f)--"no".
Comments. 1. This algorithm belongs to the class of Monte-Carlo methods. Such methods
were proposed for Dempster-Shafer formalism in (Pearl, 1988, Kampke, 1988, Laskey and
Lerner, 1989). If we this algorithm with the original Dempster's combination rule, then for
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the casewhen the conflicts between the piecesof knowledge are in somereasonablesense
restricted, we also get linear-time estimates (Wilson, 1989, 1991).
2. Our result that Smets's and Yager's rules are better than Dempster's rule because
they are feasible and Dempster's is not is in good accordance with the above-mentioned
fact that the original Dempster's rule, unlike the two others, contradicts to our intuition
(Zadeh, 1984).
5. PARALLEL COMPUTATION OF BELIEFS
Parallelization: possible advantages. Monte-Carlo methods can be easily imple-
mented in parallel (see, e.g., Pearl, 1988): indeed, they consist of applying the inference
engine to several randomly chosen sets of statements. If we have several processors at our
disposal, then we can make each of them choose and process one set of statements. So
each processor applies the inference engine only once, and the resulting running time of
this parallel algorithm equals to the running time of the inference engine. So we compute
the beliefs precisely in the same time as we apply the inference engine, and adding masses
and beliefs does not increase the running time!
How to implement it. Theoretically the more processors we have, the quicker are the
results. But in real parallel systems a lot of time is consumed on communication protocols,
information exchange, waiting in the queues, etc. The more processors we have, the more
time-consumlng all these communication procedures become, and they seriously impact
the whole computation process. So if we implement our parallelized algorithms on real
parallel systems with many processors, this additional time will add to our running time
and thus worsen our theoretical estimates.
In our case, however, during the main stage ("call inference engine") no communica-
tion is necessary, so we don't need to waste time on protocols. As a result each processor
generates one bit ("yes" or "no"), and to estimate a belief we must send these bits to one
processor and process them there. This can be done also without any protocols, by using a
small shared memory of N bits, where N is the number of processors. Such an architecture
was produced by Septor Electronics for use in machinery control applications (Roberts,
1989, Hardin and Taylor, 1990) and was efficiently used to parallelize Monte-Carlo algo-
rithms (Kreinovich et al, 1990).
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6. PROOFS
Comment. Some of the ideas that we use in these proofs appeared first in (Dantsin, 1990;
Dantsin and Kreinovich, 1990).
Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2. If an algorithm computes beliefs precisely, then, of
course, it also computes beliefs with precision e. Therefore, if we prove Theorem 2, we get
Theorem 1 as a corollary. So it is sufficient to prove Theorem 2. Let's do it.
Since we are proving a negative result, it is sufficient to construct a case, in which
the algorithm must work for a long time. Suppose that U is an algorithm that computes
beliefs with precision e. Let's take a knowledge base that consists of n pieces of knowl-
edge P1,P2,...,P,. i 'h piece of knowledge consists of two statements Ei and -_Ei, with
mi(Ei) = rni(_Ei) = 0.5. For Q let us take a statement that is different from any Boolean
combination of these El. We'll use the denotations E + for Ei and E_- for _Ei.
Let us consider only such I, that for Boolean formulas, formed from Ei, coincide with
logical implication. So, for example, El&E2 -+ El, but EI&-_E2 -/4 Ea. In particular,
for every sequence g = (q, ..., e,_) of + and - symbols I(E_ l>_'_2>_...2, .....__,>_" , f)="no". In
other words, all possible combinations of Ei and -,El are consistent.
Three combination rules differ only in case of inconsistent knowledge. Therefore
for the above-described case, when all the combinations are consistent, all three rules
lead to the same combined knowledge. This knowledge consists of 2" statements E =
E;' _E 2_=&...&E," _", and the mass of each statement equals to ml (El I )m2(E_ =)...m(E_" ) =
(1/2)" = 2-". So for every query Q the belief beI(Q) equals to the sum of the masses of
all the statements that imply Q, i.e., to 2-aN(Q), where by N(Q) we denoted the total
number of statements E that imply Q.
Let us denote the number of times, during which our algorithm U called the inference
engine I to know whether E implies Q for some E, by N. If N < 2", this means that for
some of 2" combinations E we did not ask whether E --+ Q. So, if we take an inference
engine J that coincides with I on all Boolean combinations of Ei and on all the pairs
(E, Q). for which the algorithm U called I, and apply the same algorithm to this J instead
of I, U will not feel the difference, because whenever it asks an inference engine something,
it still gets the same results. So the result Uj(Q) of applying this algorithm to J will be
same, as in case of I: Uj(Q) = UI(Q). Let's take two such J: J_ says "yes" for all
pairs (E, Q), for which U did not ask /'; and J2 answers "no" on all such pairs. Let us
I 1 __[% _
denote the number of statements, for which Ji(E, Q)= "yes", by Ni(Q). The difference
between NI(Q) and N2(Q) consists precisely of 2" - Nc statements E, for which U did
not ask I, i.e., N:(Q) - N2(Q) = 2" - N. Since in our case beI(O) = 2-_N(Q), we
conclude, that the values of belief beli(Q), that correspond to Ji, satisfy the equality
beI_(Q) - bel2(Q) = 2-"(2" - N) = 1 - 2-'_N. But we took an algorithm that computes
beliefs with precision e, therefore the result U(Q) of this algorithm must differ from both of
these beliefs by no more than e: tbeII(Q)-U(Q)] <_ e and ]beI2(Q)-L;(Q)] <__e. From these
inequalities we conclude, that [bel:(Q)-bel2(Q)[ <_ lbdl(Q)-V(Q)l+lbd2(Q)-V(Q)l <_2_.
and so 1 - 2-nN _< 2e. So 2-"N > (1 - 2e) and therefore N >__2"(1 - 2e). Since e < 1/2,
this difference 1 - 2e is positive.
So the total running time is >_ t¢N >_ 2"(1-2e), i.e. it is really exponentially increasing
with the length of the input. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let's prove this theorem by reductio ad absurdum: we'll suppose
that such a polynomial algorithm U exists, and conclude that RP = NP, i.e., that there
exists a polynomial-time probabilistic algorithm that solves one of NP-complete problems.
Namely, we'll construct such an algorithm for the propositional satisfiability problem.
Indeed, suppose that U exists, and we have a propositional formula P with n propositional
variables Xl,...,xn. Let's figure out whether this formula is satisfiable or not. For that
purpose let's introduce a new propositional variable x,_+l and consider the knowledge base
that consists of the following n + 1 pieces of knowledge P:, ..., Pk+:. When i _< k, then Pi
consists of two statements xi and "-,xi with equal masses. Pk+l consists of two statements
P&-,zn+i and xx&x2&...&x,_,.U.z,,+:, also with equal masses.
Statements of the combined knowledge base are formed as follows: for every i from
1 to n we must choose either xi or ",xi, and then we must choose either P&-,xn+:, or
x1&xa&...,.kx,&xn+l. In other words, we must first choose an n-dimensional Boolean
vector 2" = (Xl,..., z,), and then choose one of the statements, with which it is consistent:
P&--,x,+l or .rl&x2&...&x,,&z,,+:. For each vector 2" consistency is easy to check: if P is
true for this a7 (and this can be checked in polynomial time), then the first is consistent, if
x: = z2 = ... = z,_ = true, then the second one is consistent. So we can easily implement
logical consistency checking for these cases.
The resulting masses are as follows: If P is not satisfiable, then the combina-
tions with P&-,x,,+: are inconsistent, and therefore the only consistent combination is
z:&x2&...&x,,&z,_+:; therefore it gets the mass 1. If P is satisfiable, and N is the number
of Boolean vectors that satisfy it, then we have N + 1 consistent combinations. Since all
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the massesin all the piecesof knowledgeareequal, the massesassignedto theseconsistent
combinations are also equal, so we assign 1/(N + 1) to each.of them.
Let us take Q = x,_+l. For every statement E from the combined knowledge base
we already know x,,+l, so the trivial algorithm will work as I in this case. The resulting
belief bet(Q) is as follows: if P is satisfiable, then beI(Q) = 1. If P is not satisfiable, then
bel(Q) = 1/(N + 1), where N > 1, so bel(Q) <_ 1/2.
If IU(Q) - bel(Q)l < 1/4, then in case bel(Q) = 1 we have U(Q) > 1 - 1/4 = 3/4,
and in case beI(Q) <_ 1/2 we have U(Q) < 1/2+ 1/4 = 3/4. So if we apply U to this
knowledge base and compare U(Q) with 3/4, we can tell whether P is satisfiable or not:
if U(Q) < 3/4, it is satisfiable; when U(Q) > 3/4, it is not. So, using U, we constructed
an algorithm that checks whether a formula is satisfiable with reliability _> 1 - P0. So our
assumption that a polynomial-time algorithm U can compute beliefs with given precision
and reliability contradicts to the assumption that RP # NP. Therefore such an algorithm
U is impossible. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4. That the algorithm described in Section 4 is linear-time can be
easily seen: the number Nc of calls for I equals either to N (in Smets's case) or to 2N (in
Yager's case); in both cases it does not depend on the input length at all. Likewise the
number of times during which this algorithm calls the random-number generator is limited
by N. As for additional computations, for each of N iterations they demand looking
through all the pieces of the knowledge base N times, i.e., the necessary running time is
< const • Nn and is therefore linear in n.
Let us now prove that these linear-time algorithms really work. Let's first con-
sider the Smets's rule. By definition beI(Q) = _-,E: E--Q re(E), where E runs over
all combinations Ei&..._:Fj of statements form different pieces of knowledge. And the
masses re(E) are equal to re(E) = _i,j: E.-.(E,S_..._:F_)rnl(Ei)...rnk(Fj). Substitut-
ing this expression for re(E) into the formula for bel(Q), we conclude, that bel(Q) =
_-,E: E--O _-,i,j: E--(E_...._.Fj)rnl(Ei)...mk(Fj). We defined an inference engine as a con-
sistent algorithm, i.e., an algorithm, for which A _ B implies that I(A, Q) = I(B, Q). In
particular, if E _ (E_&...&Fj), then E --* Q if and only if (E_,._...&Fj) _ Q. Therefore
the above expression for bel(Q) can be simplified:
i,j: ( Ei&c...&Fi )-- Q
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Let us now prove that this expression equals to some probability. We say that a
statement is randomIy chosen from a piece of knowledge ((El,..., Ek),m) if it coincides
with Ei with probability m(Ei). We suppose that the choices from different pieces of
knowledge are independent. In this case the probability that a sequence Ei,..., F 1 is chosen,
equals to ml(Ei)...mt.(Fj). Therefore the right-hand side of the above formula for beI(Q)
is the sum of the probabilities of all cases, in which the chosen sequence implies Q, i.e.,
beI(Q) equaIs to the probability that a random sequence implies Q.
Comment. This fact does not mean that we interpret masses as probabilities: it is a purely
formal equality, that may have nothing to do with semantics of masses, but that turns out
to be useful for computing beliefs.
This probability can be computed as follows: we make several (N) simulations of the
random event, and estimate probability p by a ratio M/N, where M is the'. number of
cases, in which the event happened (in our case in which the randomly chosen sequence
implied Q). The precision of these estimates is known from mathematical statistics: to get
a precision e with reliability 1 -po, we must take N = 2e -2 ln(2/p0) (so called Hoefding
theorem; see also Dantsin and Kreinovich, 1990, Wilson, 1989, 1991).
For big N the distribution for the difference p - M/N is close to Gaussian, so we can
use the estimates for the Gaussian distribution. In particular, we get N = 100 for e = 0.1
and p0 = 0.05.
For Yager's case the arguments are the same, with the only difference that bel(Q) is
equal to the probability that the randomly chosen sequence is consistent and implies Q.
Q.E.D.
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